On Using Proportional Representation Methods as Alternatives to Pro-Rata Based Order Matching Algorithms in Stock Exchanges

The main observation of this short note is that methods for determining proportional representation in electoral systems may be suitable as alternatives to the pro-rata order matching algorithm used in stock exchanges. Our simulation studies provide strong evidence that the Jefferson/D'Hondt and the Webster/Saint-Lagu\"{e} proportional representation methods provide order allocations which are closer to proportionality than the order allocations obtained from the pro-rata algorithm

Software Effort Prediction - A Fuzzy Logic Approach

Accuracy in the estimation of software Effort/Cost is one of the desirable criteria for any software cost estimation model. The estimation of effort or cost before the actual development of any software is the most crucial task of the present day software development project managers. Software project attributes are often measured in terms of linguistic values such as very low, low, Average, high and very high. The imprecise nature of such attributes constitutes uncertainty and vagueness in their subsequent interpretation. In this paper we propose a Fuzzy logic based model for software effort prediction. We feel that fuzzy Software cost estimation Model should be able to deal with imprecision and uncertainty associated with various parameter values. Fuzzy analogy model has been developed and validated upon student data

Voting in the Goods and Service Tax Council of India

In 2017, India enacted a new taxation law called the Goods and Services Tax (GST). This law created a GST Council with representatives of the Union government and the Provincial governments. The decision making procedure in the GST Council is specified to be by weighted voting. This work performs a detailed study of such a mechanism using the framework of formal voting games. On a theoretical note, we introduce several new notions regarding blocking dynamics of voting games. These are then applied to the study of voting in the GST context. We identify a set of basic desiderata and propose some modifications to the voting rule in the GST Act

Cryptocurrency Voting Games

This work shows that weighted majority voting games occur in cryptocurrencies. In particular, two such games are highlighted. The first game, which we call the Rule Game, pertains to the scenario where the entities in the system engage in a voting procedure to accept or reject a change of rules. The second game, which we call the Attack Game, refers to the scenario where a group of entities in a cryptocurrency system can form a coalition to engage in double spending. For the Rule Game we provide analysis to argue that the Coleman’s preventive power measure is the appropriate tool for measuring a player’s influence in the game while for the Attack Game, we define a notion of stability based on the notion of minimal winning coalitions. For both the Rule Game and the Attack Game, we show how to analyse the games based on a snapshot of real world data for Bitcoin which is presently the most popular of all the cryptocurrencies

Voting in the Goods and Service Tax Council of India

In 2017, India enacted a new taxation law called the Goods and Services Tax (GST). This law created a GST Council with representatives of the Union government and the Provincial governments. The decision making procedure in the GST Council is specified to be by weighted voting. This work performs a detailed study of such a mechanism using the framework of formal voting games. On a theoretical note, we introduce several new notions regarding blocking dynamics of voting games. These are then applied to the study of voting in the GST context. We identify a set of basic desiderata and propose some modifications to the voting rule in the GST Act

Voting in the Goods and Services Tax Council of India

The Goods and Services Tax (GST) law (2017) of India, created a GST Council with representatives of the Union government and the Provincial governments. The decision making procedure in this Council is specified to be by weighted voting. We perform a detailed study of such a mechanism using the framework of formal voting games. On a theoretical note, several new notions regarding blocking dynamics of voting games are introduced. These are then applied to the voting mechanism in the GST Council. We identify a set of basic desiderata and propose some modifications to the voting rule in the GST Act

Correlation and inequality in weighted majority voting games

In a weighted majority voting game, the weights of the players are determined based on some socio-economic parameter. A number of measures have been proposed to measure the voting powers of the different players. A basic question in this area is to what extent does the variation in the voting powers reflect the variation in the weights? The voting powers depend on the winning threshold. So, a second question is what is the appropriate value of the winning threshold? In this work, we propose two simple ideas to address these and related questions in a quantifiable manner. The first idea is to use Pearson's Correlation Coefficient between the weight vector and the power profile to measure the similarity between weight and power. The second idea is to use standard inequality measures to quantify the inequality in the weight vector as well as in the power profile. These two ideas answer the first question. Both the weight-power similarity and inequality scores of voting power profiles depend on the value of the winning threshold. For situations of practical interest, it turns out that it is possible to choose a value of the winning threshold which maximises the similarity score and also minimises the difference in the inequality scores of the weight vector and the power profile. This provides an answer to the second question. Using the above formalisation, we are able to quantitatively argue that it is sufficient to consider only the vector of swings for the players as the power measure. We apply our methodology to the voting games arising in the decision making processes of the International Monetory Fund (IMF) and the European Union (EU). In the case of IMF, we provide quantitative evidence that the actual winning threshold that is currently used is sub-optimal and instead propose a winning threshold which has a firm analytical backing. On the other hand, in the case of EU, we provide quantitative evidence that the presently used threshold is very close to the optimal

Cryptocurrency Voting Games

This work shows that weighted majority voting games occur in cryptocurrencies. In particular, two such games are highlighted. The first game, which we call the Rule Game, pertains to the scenario where the entities in the system engage in a voting procedure to accept or reject a change of rules. The second game, which we call the Attack Game, refers to the scenario where a group of entities in a cryptocurrency system can form a coalition to engage in double spending. For the Rule Game we provide analysis to argue that the Coleman’s preventive power measure is the appropriate tool for measuring a player’s influence in the game while for the Attack Game, we define a notion of stability based on the notion of minimal winning coalitions. For both the Rule Game and the Attack Game, we show how to analyse the games based on a snapshot of real world data for Bitcoin which is presently the most popular of all the cryptocurrencies

Voting in the Goods and Services Tax Council of India

The Goods and Services Tax (GST) law (2017) of India, created a GST Council with representatives of the Union government and the Provincial governments. The decision making procedure in this Council is specified to be by weighted voting. We perform a detailed study of such a mechanism using the framework of formal voting games. On a theoretical note, several new notions regarding blocking dynamics of voting games are introduced. These are then applied to the voting mechanism in the GST Council. We identify a set of basic desiderata and propose some modifications to the voting rule in the GST Act

Complete Tree Subset Difference Broadcast Encryption Scheme and its Analysis

The Subset Difference (SD) method proposed by Naor, Naor and Lotspiech is the most popular broadcast encryption (BE) scheme. It is suitable for real-time applications like Pay-TV and has been suggested for use by the AACS standard for digital rights management in Blu-Ray and HD-DVD discs. The SD method assumes the number of users to be a power of two. We propose the Complete Tree Subset Difference (CTSD) method that allows the system to support an arbitrary number of users. In particular, it subsumes the SD method and all results proved for the CTSD method also hold for the SD method. Recurrences are obtained for the CTSD scheme to count the number, $N(n,r,h)$, of possible ways $r$ users in the system of $n$ users can be revoked to result in a transmission overhead or header length of $h$. The recurrences lead to a polynomial time dynamic programming algorithm for computing $N(n,r,h)$. Further, they provide bounds on the maximum possible header length. A probabilistic analysis is performed to obtain an $O(r \log{n})$ time algorithm to compute the expected header length in the CTSD scheme. Further, for the SD scheme we obtain an explicit limiting upper bound on the expected header length